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STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE
CHARLES HARPER ANDERSONt
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has been confronted with
numerous issues which require a reconciliation of the principle
of maintaining free interstate trade and that requiring persons
engaged in interstate commerce to bear their share of state taxa-
tion. In deciding these issues the Court has used various words
to state and explain applicable legal tests." To understand these
tests the situations from which they were originated, as well as
those in which they were applied, should be examined.
The classic test, which was originated in Robbins v. Shelby
County Taxing District,2 was deduced from a situation in which
a Tennessee statute3 requiring all drummers to pay a license tax
was applied to a drummer from Ohio. In holding the statute
t Assistant Professor of Jurisprudence, College of William and Mary.
1. In attempting to establish uniformity in the law of this field, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 254 (1946), stated:
The Commerce Clause does not involve an exercise in the logic of
empty categories. It operates within the framework of our federal
scheme and with due regard to the national experience reflected by the
decisions of this Court even though the terms in which these decisions
have been cast may have varied. Language alters, and there is a
fashion in judicial writing as in other things.
But see Justice William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COL. L. REV. 735
(1949), in which the author develops the idea that the doctrine of stare
decisis does not apply to constitutional law because each Justice must use
his own interpretation of the Constitution to conform with the oath taken
to support the Constitution.
2. 120 U.S. 489 (1887).
3. All drummers, and all persons not having a regular licensed house
of business in the Taxing District, offering for sale or selling goods,
wares, or merchandise therein, by sample, shall be required to pay to
the county trustee the sum of $10 per week, or $25 per month, for
such privilege and no license shall be issued for a longer period than
three months.
Tenn. Stats., 1881, c. 96, § 16.
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unconstitutional, Mr. Justice Bradley, delivering the opinion of
the Supreme Court, stated:
Interstate commerce cannot be taxed at all, even though the
same amount of tax should be laid on domestic commerce,
or that which is carried on solely within the state .... 4
A state, in other words, cannot use interstate commerce or any
part thereof as a taxable event because the tax would conflict
with the Congressional power to regulate interstate commerce.
The taxable event must be determined in order to apply this rule
and then classified as interstate or intrastate commerce.
The Tennessee statute made the privilege of offering for sale,
or selling goods in Tennessee, the taxable event, and the Court
recognized this fact. The process of selecting the taxable event
from the wording or definitions of the statute was thus estab-
lished. Classifying the taxable event, the Court stated:
The negotiation of sales of goods which are in another state,
for the purpose of introducing them into the state in which
the negotiation is made, is interstate commerce. 6
The obvious method of avoiding the rule that interstate com-
merce could not be taxed was to tax an intrastate event. Missouri
attempted to require a license of all peddlers who sold in the state
goods grown, produced, or manufactured outside of the state.
Although the Court could have classified the peddling of out of
state goods interstate commerce and applied the taxable event
rule, the Court chose, instead, to hold the tax invalid because it
discriminated against interstate commerce. 7
Discrimination against interstate commerce invalidated the
tax irrespective of the classification of the taxable event. Even
though the taxable event may be intrastate commerce, the tax
could not discriminate against interstate commerce. A state,
therefore, could not avoid the result of the rule that interstate
commerce could not be taxed by placing a discriminatory tax on
an intrastate event.
4. Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489, 497 (1887).
Justices Field and Gray concurred in a dissenting opinion by Chief Justice
Waite which -was based on the theory that, if the license tax was valid as to
Tennessee residents, but invalid as to nonresidents, a discrimination would
exist which would conflict with the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
U.S. CONST. Art. 14, § 1.
5. U.S. CoNST. Art. I, § 8, clause 3, "The Congress shall have Power to
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes."
6. Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489, 497 (1887).
7. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875).
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The discrimination rule was applied by determining whether
intrastate commerce was placed in a favorable economic position
with relation to interstate commerce as a result of the tax. Since
one purpose of the Commerce Clause was to prevent economic
barriers between the states, the discrimination rule was a logical
deduction from the Constitution. The discrimination rule, how-
ever, was not applicable to the factual situation in the Robbins
case because the tax applied equally to intrastate and interstate
drummers.
At the time of the Robbins case (1887), the people of the
United States needed more consumer goods. Production of goods
would be increased if markets were readily available. The
Supreme Court knocked down a barrier to a market by establish-
ing the rule that interstate commerce cannot be taxed and then
classifying drumming as interstate commerce.8 The statement of
the legal test and the process of determination of the taxable
event were seemingly made rigid, but a complete definition of
interstate commerce was not attempted. The Court could, there-
fore, use this flexible factor to accomplish the purpose of the
Commerce Clause without being restricted to the extent it would
have been had the Court attempted to make a rigid formula to
determine the interstate-intrastate classification. 9
THE TAXABLE EVENT TEST
With the advent of large scale industrialization came the eco-
nomic cycle of prosperity and depression. States as well as
individuals suffered the effects of the far-reaching depression,
and both had to search for new methods to obtain income. To the
states new forms of taxation seemed to be a possible answer.
The New York legislature, for example, authorized the City of
New York to adopt and impose any tax within the city which
the legislature would have power to impose, provided the pro-
ceeds of the tax were used exclusively for unemployment relief.lo
8. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Com-
merce Clause for the period 1850-90 in regard to state law affecting inter-
state commerce, see RIBBLE, STATE AND NATIONAL POwER ovER CommnIEnc(1st ed. 1937).
9. For a complete discussion of cases in this field until 1918, see Powell,
Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority By the Taxing Powers of the
States (in eight installments), 31 HARV. L. REV. 321, 572, 721, 932 (1918),
and 32 HARv. L. Rnv. 234, 374, 634, 902 (1919).
10. N.Y. Laws 1933, c. 815, as amended N.Y. Laws 1934, c. 873.
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Pursuant to this authorization, the city adopted a retail sales
tax."1
The validity of this tax when applied to goods shipped into
the state was challenged on the ground that it conflicted with
the Congressional power to regulate interstate commerce. The
particular facts of the case, McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal
Mining Co.,12 involved a contract made in New York City for
coal to be mined in Pennsylvania and shipped to the city for
delivery. The price of the coal was subject to variations in
mining and transportation costs. The issue was whether the
sales tax, as applied to this transaction, was made illegal by the
Commerce Clause. Mr. Justice Stone, answering the question in
the negative for the Court, stated:
Its [the tax's] only relation to the commerce arises from the
fact that immediately preceding transfer of possession to
the purchaser within the state, which is the taxable event
regardless of the time and place of passing title, the mer-
chandise has been transported in interstate commerce and
brought to its journey's end.1
The rigid rule that the taxable event cannot be interstate com-
merce was applied, and the definition of the taxable event was
taken from the tax ordinance--". . . transfer of title or posses-
sion, or both.. ."' -but the flexible factor, the definition of inter-
state commerce, was again used to decide the issue.
The shipment of coal from Pennsylvania to New York was
undoubtedly interstate commerce because the subject matter was
commerce, and that subject matter was moved from one state to
another state, but, according to the Court, the delivery of pos-
session in New York was a separate event apart from the inter-
state commerce. This classification of delivery of possession as
intrastate commerce, although difficult to foresee from the
Robbins decision, was not completely inconsistent with other
decisions under the Commerce Clause. The question, for example,
whether Congress has the power to regulate an event at the end
of the chain of interstate commerce was distinguishable from
11. City of N.Y., Local Law #24 (1934) (published as Local Law #25).
12. 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
13. Id. at 49. Justices McReynolds and Roberts joined with Chief Justice
Hughes in his dissent, which contended that delivery was a necessary and
inseparable part of the interstate commerce.
14. See note 10 supra.
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the question whether the exercise of state power over such an
event conflicted with the Commerce Clause.15
The inclusion of drumming in the chain of events constituting
interstate commerce and the exclusion of delivery of possession
to a purchaser seem difficult to reconcile from an analytical point
of view, but the promotion of industry in 1887 and provision for
unemployment relief in the depression of the 1930's were un-
doubtedly influencing factors. Although the taxable event test
was stated as a rigid analytical test, economic factors influenced
the Court in classifying particular events interstate or intrastate
commerce.
After the initial Commerce Clause obstacle had been overcome
by the retail sales tax, state sales taxes as applied to other factual
situations arose. 6 In MeLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co.,17 Arkansas
attempted to impose a sales tax (unaccompanied by a compensat-
ing use tax) upon transactions which originated through orders
taken in Arkansas by traveling salesmen and which became con-
tracts by acceptance in Tennessee. Delivery of possession, ac-
cording to the contract, was to be made in Tennessee. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, rendering the Court's opinion invalidating the
tax, stated:
in this case the Tennessee seller was through selling in
Tennessee. We would have to destroy both business and legal
notions to deny that under these circumstances the sale-the
transfer of ownership-was made in Tennessee. For Arkan-
sas to impose a tax on such transactions would be to project
its power beyond its boundaries and to tax an interstate
transaction."8
The taxable event was defined by the Arkansas statute as the
transfer of title or possession. 9 Title was transferred simul-
15. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); National Labor Relations Board v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
16. Numerous articles have been written on the relation of the sales tax
to the Commerce Clause. For one of the latest and most complete, see
Snell, Sales Taxes and Interstate Commerce, 27 TAx MAG. 37 (1949).
17. 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
18. Id. at 330. Justices Douglas and Black joined in Mr. Justice Murphy's
dissent, which criticized the Court's opinion for drawing a distinction be-
tween a sales and use tax. Id. at 332. Mr. Justice Rutledge dissented on the
ground that this case was not distinguishable from other sales and use tax
cases in which the taxes had been held valid. The effect of the Arkansas tax
and the other taxes which had been held valid was the same in that neither
put an undue burden on interstate commerce. Id. at 349.
19. See McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 205 Ark. 780, 171 S.W.2d 62
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taneously with delivery of possession to the carrier in Tennessee;
therefore, the Court held that the tax amounted to an attempt
by Arkansas to exercise ". . . its powers beyond its boundaries
and to tax an interstate transaction." 20
Even if the taxable event had occurred in Tennessee before
interstate commerce began, Arkansas would have had no juris-
diction over the event because any attempted regulation or tax
would have violated the Due Process Clause, U.S. Const. Amend.
XIV,21 but Tennessee would have had the power to impose and
collect a sales tax on that event because the event occurred within
Tennessee's jurisdiction. In relying upon the Commerce Clause
as well as the Due Process Clause, the Court was, in addition
to holding the tax invalid as applied to the particular facts,
thereby discouraging the imposition of a sales tax by the state
of the seller.
The inclusion of delivery of possession from the seller to the
carrier, as well as transfer of ownership in the chain of inter-
state commerce, was entirely consistent with the general trend
of rendering a broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause,22
and also consistent with the decisions invalidating taxes levied
upon transactions by the seller's state.23 On the other hand, the
inclusion of delivery of possession from the seller to the carrier
in the chain of interstate events24 and the exclusion of delivery
of possession from the carrier to the buyer 2 were inconsistent
when interstate commerce is viewed as a chain of physical events.
Since the immediate result of the McLeod case could have been
accomplished by relying upon the Due Process Clause alone, the
Court must have used the Commerce Clause in the reasoning to
accomplish another purpose, namely, to discourage the imposi-
tion of a tax upon the transaction by the seller's state. Since the
buyer will bear the ultimate economic burden of the tax (as
between the buyer and the seller), the buyer's state should
receive the tax benefits. If both states were allowed to tax the
(1943), for the interpretation of the tax statutes, Ark. Acts 1937, No. 154,
and Ark. Acts 1941, No. 386.
20. See note 18 supra.
21. Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. 300 (U.S. 1873).
22. See note 15 supra.
23. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946); Adams Manufacturing Co.
v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938).
24. M Leod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
25. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
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same transaction, interstate buying and selling of goods also
obtainable from an intrastate seller would cease. This economic
reason, then, was evidently the cause for the classification of
delivery of possession from the seller to the carrier as interstate
commerce-a holding inconsistent with the classification of deliv-
ery of possession from the carrier to the buyer as intrastate
commerce in the Berwind-White decision.
The Court intimated that Arkansas could accomplish its
desired result by adopting a compensation use tax to accompany
the sales tax, 2 but the Court would not hold valid a sales tax as
applied to the transaction involved, even though such a result
would have been consistent with the policy of permitting taxation
by the buyer's state.
Before consideration of a sales tax as affected by the Com-
merce Clause is concluded, the situation of a foreign buyer from
a domestic seller should be mentioned. In addition to the Com-
merce Clause, the Constitutional Import-Export Clause 27 applied
to most of these cases,2 8 and thus distinguished these situations
from the Berwind-White case. Since duties on exports were con-
stitutionally prohibited and the goods were destined for imme-
diate export, the sales tax was held invalid.2 This result, of
course, was obviously consistent with the policy of denying the
power to tax interstate transactions to the seller's state.
Turning from the sales tax30 to a gross receipts tax, the case
26. "Whatever might be the fate of such a [use] tax were it before
us, the not too short answer is that Arkansas has chosen not to impose such
a use tax. . . " 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944).
27. U.S. CONsT. Art. I, § 10, clause 2:
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any imposts
or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely
necessary for executing its inspection laws: and the net Produce of
all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports,
shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all
such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Control of the
Congress.
28. See Joseph v. Carter & Weeks Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947);
Richfield Oil Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69 (1946);
McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generale Trans., 309 U.S. 430 (1940); McGoldrick
v. Gulf Oil Co., 309 U.S. 414 (1940); Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v.
Tax Commission of State of Washington, 302 U.S. 90 (1937).
29. Richfield Oil Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69 (1946).
30. For other recent Supreme Court cases involving sales and/or use
taxes, see General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission of Iowa, 322 U.S.
335 (1944); Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co. 312 U.S. 373 (1941);
Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941); McGoldrick v. Felt &
Tarrant Mfg. Co., 309 U.S. 70 (1940); Southern Pac. v. Gallagher, 306
U.S. 167 (1939); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 182 (1939);
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of Pudget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. Tax Commission of State
of Washington3' illustrates the three propositions under imme-'
diate consideration, namely, the application of the rule that no
state can tax interstate commerce in determining the validity of
the state tax, the definition of the taxable event, and the classi-
fication of the event as interstate or intrastate commerce. In this
case the state gross receipts tax32 upon the privilege of engaging
in business within the State of Washington, as applied to a steve-
doring company which (a) loaded and unloaded cargo of vessels
engaged in foreign and interstate commerce, and (b) furnished
stevedores to shipowners or masters in order that they could load
or unload the cargo, was unanimously held invalid as applied to
(a) and valid as applied to (b).
Following the familiar rule that the taxable event cannot be
interstate commerce and determining from the tax statute that
the taxable event was the privilege of engaging in business in
Washington, the Court, by Mr. Justice Cardozo, stated:
The business of loading and unloading being interstate or
foreign commerce, the state of Washington is not at liberty
to tax the privilege of doing it by exacting in return therefor
a percentage of the gross receipts .... What is decisive is
the nature of the act, not the person of the actor....
The business of appellant, in so far as it consists of supply-
ing longshoremen to shipowners or masters without direct-
ing or controlling the work of loading or unloading, is not
interstate or foreign commerce, but rather a local business,
and subject like business generally, to taxation by the state.33
The taxable event was the privilege of engaging in business
in Washington, and since the stevedoring company engaged in
Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939); and Henneford
v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
31. 302 U.S. 90 (1937).
32. The Court described the tax in the following terms:
A statute of the State of Washington provides that for the privilege
of engaging in business activities within the state a tax shall be
payab e by persons so engaged, payment to be made according to a
designated measure. As to certain forms of business, as, for example,
manufacturing and sales at retail or wholesale, the measure is a
specially prescribed percentage of the value of the products or the
gross receipts of sales. As to all other forms of business there is a
general provision that the tax shall be equal to the gross income of
the business multiplied by the rate of one half of one per cent. ...
This general provision is broad enough to cover the business of a
stevedore.
Id. at 91.
33. Id. at 94.
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two different types of business, each type had to be classified
separately. As Mr. Justice Cardozo said, "What is decisive is the
nature of the act, not the person of the actor." 34
One type of business, the loading or unloading of the cargo
of a ship, occurred at least one step closer to the middle of the
chain of events than delivery of possession, which had been the
borderline case in separating intrastate from interstate events ;35
therefore, the result of classifying loading and unloading as
interstate or foreign commerce seemed reasonable. The position
of the taxable event in the chain of interstate commerce was not
a conclusive factor, but, nevertheless, the fact that it was closer
to the center made it more difficult to separate from the other
events. Just as the voyage aboard the ship and the trip via train
or truck were physical links in the chain of interstate commerce,
the loading and unloading, though generally not moving the
cargo so great a distance as the ship, train, or truck, constituted
an essential movement in the interstate commerce.
The furnishing of stevedores to the shipowner or master, on
the other hand, was held to be intrastate commerce. Although
the work of the stevedores was interstate commerce, the business
of supplying the stevedores to shipowners or masters, which was
quite analogous to that of an employment agency, was parallel to
but outside the chain of interstate commerce. The supplying of
stevedores was one step away on a horizontal plane from the
point where loading and unloading appeared in the vertical inter-
state commerce line; therefore, this form of business was intra-
state commerce.
The policy of permitting taxation by the buyer's state but
denying this power to the seller's state was irrelevant in this case,
in that the buyer and/or seller of the goods constituting the cargo
of the vessel might or might not have been a Washington resi-
dent. The result of the case emphasized legal analysis over
economic effect, since the economic burden of the tax on the
business of loading and unloading would rest in exactly the same
place as the tax on the business of supplying stevedores to the
vessel; yet the latter was held valid and the former invalid.
Several of the cases arising under the Indiana gross income
34. Ibid.
35. McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944); McGoldrick v.
Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
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tax statute36 also serve to exemplify the concept of interstate
commerce confronted by state taxation. In Department of Trea-
suryv. Wood Preserving Co.,37 the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad
Company contracted with the Wood Preserving Company, a
Delaware corporation, to furnish railroad ties and creosote
them. Pursuant to the contract, the Wood Preserving Company,
through its Indiana agents, arranged for local vendors to deliver
the ties at a point in Indiana alongside the Baltimore and Ohio
line where the railroad inspectors accepted or rejected the ties.
The accepted ties were immediately shipped to a plant in Ohio
where the Wood Preserving Company chemically treated them.
The Wood Preserving Company paid the Indiana vendors for
the accepted ties and billed the railroad separately for the ties
and the treatment of the ties, but the Wood Preserving Company
received payment for both bills in Pennsylvania. Chief Justice
Hughes, rendering the opinion of the Court unanimously holding
the income from the sale of the ties to the railroad by the Wood
Preserving Company was subject to the Indiana tax, states:
These were local transactions,-sales and deliveries of par-
ticular ties by respondent to the Railroad Company in
Indiana. The transactions were none the less intrastate ac-
tivities because the ties thus sold and delivered were forth-
with loaded on the railroad cars to go to Ohio for treatment. 8
The taxable event, according to the statute, was for residents
of Indiana, the receipt of gross income, and for nonresidents, the
receipts of "gross income derived from sources within the State
of Indiana." Although the Wood Preserving Company received
payment in Pennsylvania, the right to receive this payment was
derived from events which occurred in Indiana. If the mere
36. IND. ANN. STAT., C. 50, § 2 (Burns 1933):
There is hereby imposed a tax, measured by the amount or volume of
gross income, and in the amount to be determined by the application
of rates on such gross income as hereinafter provided. Such tax shall
be levied upon the entire gross income of all residents of the State of
Indiana, and upon the gross income derived from sources within the
the State of Indiana, of all persons and/or companies, including
banks, who are not residents of the State of Indiana, but are engaged
in business in this state, or who derive gross income from sources
within this state, and shall be in addition to all other taxes now or
hereafter imposed with respect to particular occupations and/or
activities. Said tax shall apply to, and shall be levied and collected
upon, all gross incomes received on or after the first day of May, 1933,
with such exceptions and limitations as may be hereinafter provided.
37. 313 U.S. 62 (1941).
38. Id. at 68.
39. See note 36 supra.
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receipt of income was the taxable event, every nonresident could
avoid the tax by arranging for payment outside of Indiana. The
true taxable event, then, was the derivation of the right to receive
the income.
After determining the taxable event, the question whether the
right to receive the income was derived from interstate or intra-
state commerce had to be answered. The chain of events begin-
ning with the making of the contract and terminating with pay-
ment for the goods and services included arrangement with local
vendors for delivery of the ties, inspection and acceptance by the
railroad company, and shipment to Ohio for treatment. Although
the Court did not expressly state that any part of this chain of
events constituted interstate commerce, the Court did state that
the sale from the Wood Preserving Company to the railroad was
an intrastate (Indiana) event.
Neither the seller nor the buyer was an Indiana resident, but
the sales contract, the offer and acceptance of the particular ties,
was made in Indiana. The sales contract was not necessarily
dependent upon the other events; in fact, it could have existed
independently. The Court, therefore, classified the sales contract
intrastate commerce. The basis for classification was the phys-
ical place of the happening of the offer and acceptance, and the
relation of the completed contract to the other events.
If the offer to sell had been made in Indiana and the acceptance
in another state, would the result have been different? In
Freeman v. Hewit40 where such a question was presented, the
taxpayer, an Indiana resident, had his local broker send via mail
shares of stock to New York where a New York broker sold it
on the stock exchange. The proceeds from the sale were returned
through the channel through which the stock had been disposed
of. The taxpayer, after paying the Indiana gross receipts tax on
the proceeds of the transaction under protest, brought suit for
recovery of the tax. The Court, concluding that the transaction
was an interstate sale, held that not even the fact that there was
an equal tax on intrastate (Indiana) sales kept the tax from
being invalid. 41
40. 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
41. Mr. Justice Frankfurter rendered the opinion of the Court, which
applied the taxable event test and explained the multiple tax burden test
as a mere fashion in judicial writing. (See note 1 supra). Mr. Justice
Rutledge concurred in the result but contended that the doctrine of Nippert
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The rule that interstate commerce cannot be taxed was applied.
Since the taxpayer was an Indiana resident, the taxable event
was the receipt of gross income. The acceptance in one state of
an offer made in another state was classified interstate commerce.
The receipt of income from the contract, which was interstate
commerce, was, therefore, not taxable by Indiana because such
a tax conflicted with the Commerce Clause. Although the Court
did not state why the execution of the contract was interstate
commerce, the fact that the physical sites of the happening of
the offer (Indiana) and the acceptance (New York) were in two
states was evidently the reason. The result of the case was dis-
tinguishable from the Berwind-White decision in that the taxable
events of the two cases were entirely different.
The classification of the contract as interstate commerce was
consistent with the Wood Preserving Company case and was,
undoubtedly, the important factor influencing the Court to inval-
idate the tax, but, in addition, the policy of denying the power
to tax a sale to the seller's state was thus continued.
THE MuLTIPLE TAX BURDEN TEST
A variation from the taxable event test occurred in Western
Live Stock v. Bureau of Internal Revenue,42 which involved the
New Mexico gross receipts tax43 on the privilege of engaging in
v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946), should be followed and that the multiple
tax burden test should invalidate the tax. 329 U.S. 249, 259. Mr. Justice
Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice Murphy concurred, dissented on the ground
that the Court's opinion confused a gross receipts tax on the Indiana
resident was a gross receipts tax on the Indiana broker. They, in other
words, thought that the taxable event was reasonably separable from the
interstate commerce. Id. at 283. Mr. Justice Black dissented without
rendering a written opinion, evidently following his formerly expressed
view that the Commerce Clause alone does not invalidate state regulation
of interstate commerce. (See note 51 infrTa). This extremely literal inter-
pretation of the Constitution is explained and supported by Hellerstein
and Hennefield, State Taxation in a National Economy, 54 HARV. L. REV.
949 (1941).
42. 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
43. N.M. STAT. ANN. c. 7, § 201 (1934):
There is hereby levied, and shall be collected by the Tax Commission,
privilege taxes, measured by the amount or volume of business done,
against the persons, on account of their business activities, engaging,
or continuing, within the State of New Mexico, in any business as
herein defined, and in the amounts determined by the application of
rates against gross receipts, as follows:
i-At an amount equal to 2 per cent of the gross receipts of any
person engaging or continuing in any of the following businesses:
... publication of newspapers and magazines (but the gross receipts
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business within the state. The owners of a magazine, Western
Live Stock, which was published in New Mexico, but which de-
rived advertising from outside New Mexico and maintained an
interstate distribution, paid the tax under protest and brought
suit for recovery of the sum paid. Mr. Justice Stone, speaking
for the Court, after having applied the taxable event test and
having concluded that the tax was valid, stated:
But there is an added reason why we think the tax is not
subject to the objection which has been leveled at taxes laid
upon gross receipts derived from interstate communication
or transportation of goods. So far as the value contributed
to appellants' [owners of Western Live Stock] New Mexico
business by circulation of the magazine interstate is taxed,
it cannot again be taxed elsewhere any more than the value
of railroad property taxed locally. The tax is not one which
in form or substance can be repeated by the other states in
such manner as to lay an added burden on the interstate
distribution of the magazine.... All the events upon which
the tax is conditioned-the preparation, printing and publi-
cation of the advertising matter, and the receipt of the sums
paid for it-occur in New Mexico and not elsewhere .... 4
Although the Court applied both the taxable event test and
the new multiple tax burden test, the possible existence of the
latter independent of the former presented a very important
question. If, for example, each state should select a taxable event
which was reasonably separable from the interstate commerce,
each tax might be valid under the taxable event test and yet
together the two taxes might constitute an invalid multiple tax
burden. The new multiple tax burden test, in other words, might
be a mere explanation of the taxable event test in that it could
explain the interstate or intrastate classification of the taxable
event, or it might be an economic formula.
The taxable event of the New Mexico gross receipts tax, as
expressly stated in the statute, was the privilege of engaging in
business in New Mexico, and as applied to newspapers and
magazines the amount of the tax was expressly limited to a
percentage of the receipts derived from the sale of advertising
space.4 5 The taxed privilege of engaging in business in New
of the business of publishing newspapers or magazines shall include
only the amounts received for the sale of advertising space)....
44. 303 U.S. 250, 260 (1938). Justices McReynolds and Butler dissented
without rendering a written opinion.
45. See note 43 supra.
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Mexico did not include the contract for sale of advertising; it
was merely the privilege of preparing, printing, and publishing
the advertising matter and receiving payments that were taxed.0
Had the taxable event been the contract, the result would have
been inconsistent with the cases heretofore discussed. 7 Since
the taxable event occurred wholly in New Mexico and was rea-
sonably separable from the interstate advertising contracts and
interstate distribution of the magazine, the Court concluded that
the taxable event was intrastate commerce. The Court in effect
viewed interstate commerce as a vertical line with the interstate
contract for the sale of advertising and the interstate distribution
of the magazine at two points in the vertical line, whereas the
preparation, printing, and publication of the advertising matter
were between these points but horizontally outside of the vertical
line. Since the taxable event was not repeated beyond the borders
of New Mexico, the taxable event was physically an intrastate
event, and, in addition, no other state could impose a similar tax
upon that event.
In any situation where application of the taxable event and
multiple tax burden tests would produce the result that the tax
was valid, the multiple burden test could be said to be merely
a means of classifying the taxable event interstate or intrastate
commerce. 48 If the conclusion from the application of both tests
was that the tax was invalid, development of the multiple tax
burden test as an independent rule would be a definite possibility.
The taxable event would have to be an interstate event to reach
such a conclusion under the taxable event test, and duplicate
taxation would have to be a definite possibility under the multiple
burden rule. The next step in establishing the multiple burden
doctrine as an independent formula would require a loose inter-
pretation of the possibility of duplicate taxation. If any tax
which would ultimately fall upon the same taxpayer as the tax
under consideration were considered a duplicate tax, an economic
formula would be established. If the rule required that the
taxable events of both taxes be one and the same in order to
establish duplicate taxation, the taxable event would, of course,
46. Ibid.
47. Particularly, Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
48. If the multiple burden test is assumed to be an economic formula,
then, of course, the result of validity of a tax by applying both as indepen-
dent tests is a possibility.
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be physically interstate commerce, and thus, the multiple burden
doctrine would be merely an incident of the taxable event test.
The court applied the multiple burden test in J. D. Adams
Manufacturing Co. v. Storen,49 and concluded that the tax in-
volved was invalid. An Indiana manufacturing company, which
sold its products in Indiana, other states, and foreign coun-
tries upon orders taken subject to approval at the Indiana home
office, sought a declaratory judgment of the validity of the
Indiana gross income tax statute0 as applied to its business.
The Court, holding the tax invalid as applied to receipts derived
from interstate and foreign sales, said:
The vice of the statute as applied to receipts from interstate
sales is that the tax includes in its measure, without appor-
tionment, receipts derived from activities in interstate
commerce; and that the exaction is of such a character that
if lawful it may in substance be laid to the fullest extent by
states in which the goods are sold as well as those in which
they are manufactured. Interstate commerce would thus be
subjected to the risk of a double tax burden to which intra-
state commerce is not exposed, and which the Commerce
Clause forbids.51
The result of invalidity of the tax by application of the multiple
tax burden test presented the potential development of an eco-
nomic formula, but, nevertheless, the possibility of duplicate
taxation could easily be explained in that the taxable event,
receipts from sales, would possibly, as to interstate and foreign
sales, be the same taxable event under the tax statute of another
state. The result of the case was entirely consistent with those
cases in which the taxable event test had been applied. The
classification of the sales contract arising out of state orders
accepted in Indiana as interstate commerce, and the use of receipt
of income as the definition of the taxable event conformed abso-
lutely with the previous decisions. The separation of interstate
49. 304 U.S. 307 (1938).
50. See note 36 supra.
51. 304 U.S. 307, 311 (1938). Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, stated:
Interstate commerce constitutes a large part of the business of the
nation. Until Congress, in the exercise of its plenary power overinterstate commerce, fixes a different policy, it would appear desirable
that the States should remain free to adopt tax systems imposing
uniform and nondiscriminatory taxes upon interstate and intrastate
business alike.
Id. at 327.
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and intrastate commerce, in the result, even of itself, signified
that there was some reliance upon the taxable event test.
The Court again applied the multiple tax burden test in Cover-
dale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Line Co.,5 2 and concluded that
the Louisiana tax53 on the privilege of generating electric power,
as applied to a corporation operating an interstate gas pipe line
and generating at a station in Louisiana electric power to be
used to compress the gas to transmit through the interstate pipe
line, was valid. Although the trial court also applied the multiple
tax burden test and held the tax invalid, the Supreme Court
reversed the trial court's decision because the test had not, in
its opinion, been applied correctly. Mr. Justice Reed, delivering
the opinion of the Court, said:
It was held by the District Court that this is a tax which
may be levied by other states and so is invalid, and that a
state's desire to save gas for its citizens may induce it to
raise the privilege tax to prohibitory rates. It is true that
each state through which a pipe line passes could lay a tax
on the use of engines for the production of power but that
would not be multiple taxation merely because interstate
commerce is being done as discussed in Western Live Stock
v. Bureau of Revenue.... It would not be a tax on the same
activity, either in form or substance. Like a property tax
on the pipes or equipment in different states, it would be a
different tax, on a different and wholly separate subject
matter, with no cumulative effect caused by the interstate
character of the business. It would not be multiple taxation
for each state to tax the booster station ad valorem as
52. 303 U. S. 604 (1938).
53. Mr. Justice Reed, rendering the opinion of the Court described the
tax as follows:
Act No. 6 of the Regular Session of 1932 of the Louisiana Legislature,
with certain qualifications and exceptions not material here, provides
for a license tax to be paid by everyone engaged within the State
in the business of manufacturing or generating electricity for heat,
light or power, § 1, or of selling electricity not manufactured or
generated by him or it, § 2. Section 3 provides that every person,
firm, corporation, or association engaged within the State in any
business, which uses in the conduct of that business electrical or
mechanical power of more than ten horsepower and does not procure
all the power from a taxpayer subject to §1 or § 2, shall be subject
to the payment of an excise, license, or privilege tax of One Dollar($1.00) per annum for each horsepower of capacity of the machinery
or apparatus known as the 'prime mover' or 'prime movers,' operated
by such person, firm, corporation or association of persons, for the
purpose of producing power for use in the conduct of such business
or occupation: ...
Id. at 605.
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property. Neither is it prohibited multiple taxation to have
the possibility of other privilege taxes on the production
of power. It is length of line, not interstate commerce, which
makes another tax possible.54
Since the taxable event was the generation of electricity, and
this event occurred wholly within Louisiana, the Court con-
cluded that there was no possibility of duplicate taxation; there-
fore, the Louisiana tax was valid. The fact that the interstate
pipe line might require other generating stations beyond Louisi-
ana's borders where other states might impose similar taxes was
said to be immaterial. However, even though the Court consid-
ered this fact immaterial, the taxpayer would have been affected
economically the same as if two states taxed the same event.
If another generating unit, on the other hand, had been located
in Louisiana, this unit would have also been subject to the
Louisiana tax.
Although the Court did not specifically apply the taxable event
test, the Court stated that the tax did not interfere with inter-
state commerce. Separation of the taxable event (generation of
power) from the interstate commerce (transmission of the gas
in the interstate pipe line) was probably not so easy as separa-
tion of delivery of possession to a buyer from an interstate sale,55
or the publication of a magazine from the advertisements derived
from interstate commerce.55 Although the Court's use of the
multiple burden test, therefore, did not conform completely with
the taxable event test, the Court, nevertheless, accomplished the
same result without having to expressly separate the generation
of power from the interstate commerce and classify that event
as intrastate commerce.
The multiple tax burden test continued to exist as a buffer
between the taxable event test and an economic test, with irregu-
lar boundaries between each. The case of Joseph v. Carter &
Weeks Stevedoring Co., 7 however, seemingly contained the final
chapter in the history of the multiple tax burden doctrine.5 3 The
54. Id. at 612. Mr. Justice McReynolds dissented, again without a
written opinion.
55. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
56. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Internal Revernue, 303 U.S. 250(1938).
57. 330 U.S. 422 (1947).
58. The economic interpretation of the multiple tax doctrine was later
embodied in the substantial effects test.
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facts of this case were identical with that phase of the Puget
Sound Stevedoring CoA9 case which had been held invalid. In
following that precedent the Court stated the applicable rule as
follows:
. . . in the present case, the threat of a multiple burden,
except in a few instances in the record of interstate, in dis-
tinction to foreign, commerce is absent.... We need consider
only whether or not the loading and unloading is distinct
enough from the commerce to permit the tax on the gross.0
The Court concluded, of course, that the loading and unloading
of cargo in vessels engaged in interstate and foreign commerce
was not separable from that commerce; therefore, the tax was
invalid.
Even though the threat of a multiple tax burden was absent,
the tax was, nevertheless, invalid because the taxable event was
interstate and foreign commerce. The taxable event test was
used, and the multiple tax burden rule was seemingly discarded.
The economic interpretation of this discarded test, however, was
destined to appear in a new form.
THE SUBSTANTIAL EFFECTS TEST
As the Court was returning to the traditional statement of the
taxable event rule, a reaction had developed and appeared in
59. 302 U.S. 90 (1937). The New York tax involved in the Carter &
Weeks case provided:
Imposition of tax. a. For the privilege of carrying on or exercising
for gain or profit within the City any trade, business, profession,
vocation or commercial activity other than a financial business, or of
making sales to persons within such city, for each of the periods of
one year, or any part thereof, beginning on July first of the years
nineteen hundred thirty-nine and nineteen hundred forty, every person
shall pay an excise tax which shall be equal to one-tenth of one
percentum upon all receipts received in and/or allocable to the City
from such profession, vocation, trade, business or commercial activity
exercised or carried on by him during the calendar year in which
such period shall commence....
City of N.Y., Local Law § 78 (1940), § R, 41-2.0.
60. Joseph v. Carter & Weeks Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422, 429
(1947). Mr. Justice Reed, delivering the opinion of the Court, recognized
that a possible multiple burden might arise from similar taxes for loading
and unloading at the terminal points of the ship's voyage, but said that that
would not be precisely the same taxable event. Justices Douglas, Murphy, and
Rutledge thought that the multiple tax burden doctrine should be followed
and concluded that in situations where the loading or unloading was inter-
state commerce the tax would be valid, but only Justices Douglas and
Rutledge thought that U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 10, clause 2 (see note 27
supra), invalidated the tax as applied to foreign commerce. Mr. Justice
Black dissented without rendering a written opinion. (See note 51 supra).
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Nippert v. Richmond.61 An ordinance62 of the City of Richmond,
Virginia, required all solicitors to obtain a license for the privi-
lege of soliciting. Upon the refusal to obtain a license by one
Nippert, whose residence was not disclosed by the evidence
presented, but who solicited business in Richmond for an out
of state concern, the Virginia courts convicted Nippert of a
misdemeanor. The facts and ordinance involved were so similar
to those of the Robbins case that counsel 3 for the city of Rich-
mond, in order to convince the Court that the judgment of the
state court should be affirmed, argued that the Robbins case had
been impliedly overruled by recent Supreme Court decisions."
Since the Court refused to overrule the Robbins case and con-
cluded that the tax was invalid, thus reversing the state court's
decision, it would seem that the Nippert case would require very
little explanation. However, in view of the reasoning followed by
the Court in reaching this conclusion, further comment will be
made. Mr. Justice Rutledge, delivering the opinion of the Court,
spoke in the following terms:
It has not yet been decided that every state tax bearing upon
or affecting commerce becomes valid, if only some conceiv-
ably or conveniently separable 'local incident' may be found
and made the focus of the tax. This is not to say that the
presence of so-called local incidents is irrelevant. On the
contrary the absence of any connection in fact between the
commerce and the state would be sufficient in itself for strik-
ing down the tax on due process grounds alone; and even
substantial connections, in an economic sense, have been
held inadequate to support the local tax. But beyond the
presence of a sufficient connection in a due process or 'juris-
dictional' sense, whether or not a 'local incident' related to
or affecting commerce may be made the subject of state
taxation depends upon other considerations of constitutional
61. 327 U.S. 416 (1946).
62. The tax provisions of the ordinance were:
[Upon] . . . -Agents-Solicitors-Persons, Firms or Corporations
engaged in business as solicitors . . . $50.00 and one-half of one per
centum of the gross earning, receipts, fees or commissions for the
preceding license year in excess of $1,000.00. Permit of Director of
Public Safety required before license will be issued....
Richmond City Code, c. 10, § 23.
63. Mr. Horace H. Edwards, of Richmond, Virginia. In 1949 he was
an unsuccessful candidate for the Democratic nomination for governor.
His political platform included adoption of a state sales tax.
64. International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S.
340 (1944); General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission, 322 U.S. 335
(1944); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
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policy having reference to the substantial effects, actual or
potential, of a particular tax in supporting or burdening
unduly the commerce. 65
Even though the taxable event was a local incident, according
to the rule stated, this fact alone did not make the tax valid.
A local incident was necessary only for the purpose of complying
with the due process requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment;
therefore, a local incident was not necessary to comply with the
Commerce Clause. Whether the local incident was interstate or
intrastate commerce was immaterial. The important factor was
the substantial effect, actual or potential, of the tax in burdening
or suppressing the commerce.
Although the Court under the new rule did not have to define
the limits of interstate commerce, the interstate commerce factor
continued to exist. The result was that meticulous distinctions",
might be eliminated but were replaced by a comparatively indefi-
nite factor-potential or actual substantial effect of the tax. The
Court, confronted with two opposing objectives, the encourage-
ment of interstate commerce and making interstate commerce
pay its proper share of state taxation, chose the former over the
latter without jeopardizing the recent decisions permitting the
state taxation.
The determination to make interstate commerce bear its
proper share of state taxation was again expressed in strong
terms in Central Greyhound Lines v. MeaZey.67 In that case the
New York Tax Commission decided that the entire gross receipts
of the Central Greyhound Lines derived from transportation
between points within New York was subject to taxation by
New York, even though 42.53 per cent of the bus route between
the terminals was outside the state's boundaries. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, rendering the opinion of the Court, commented:
In a case like this nothing is gained, and clarity is lost, by
not starting with recognition of the fact that it is interstate
65. Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 423 (1946). Justices Douglas
and Murphy dissented on the ground that since there was no discrimination
against interstate commerce, therefore, the tax should be valid. Mr. Justice
Black dissented without writing an opinion.
66. Mr. Justice Holmes, delivering the opinion of the Court in Galveston,
Harrisburg and San Antonio Ry. v. State of Texas, 210 U.S. 217, 225
(1908), stated, "It being once admitted, as of course it must be, that not
every law that effects commerce among the States is a regulation of it in a
constitutional sense, nice distinctions are to be expected...
67. 334 U.S. 653 (1948).
STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE
commerce which the State is seeking to reach and candidly
facing the real question whether what the State is exacting
is a constitutionally fair demand by the State for that aspect
of the interstate commerce to which the State bears a special
relation.,
Shortly thereafter, however, a retreat from the economic
formula began and was evidenced by a dissenting opinion in
Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone.69 The Memphis Natural Gas
Company, a Delaware corporation which owned and operated an
interstate gas line, maintained 135 miles of the interstate line
and two compressing stations in the State of Mississippi. The
corporation paid ad valorem taxes assessed against this property.
When the State of Mississippi imposed, in addition to the ad
valorem taxes, a franchise tax7 0 for the privilege of doing
68. Id. at 661. Mr. Justice Frankfurter concluded, however, that New
York was demanding more than its constitutional share, but he suggested
that if the tax were apportioned to the mileage within New York, the tax
would be valid. Justices Murphy, Black, and Douglas thought the tax
should be valid because New York was taxing only receipts from intra-
state commerce; the fact that the bus traveled an interstate route was
merely incidental to the receipt of income from transportation between
termini in New York. With respect to the measure of the tax, see Ford
Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 331 (1939), where the tax base equaled
outstanding capital stock plus surplus plus undivided profits plus outstand-
ing bonds plus notes plus debentures minus those maturing in less than a
year from date of issue, multiplied by, Texas gross receipts divided by
total gross receipts, which was held valid; International Harvester Co. v.
Evett, 329 U.S. 416 (1947), where the tax base equaled ( issued capital
stock multiplied by, value of all the taxpayer's Ohio property divided by
total value of all taxpayer's property) plus (/, issued capital stock
multiplied by, total value of business done in Ohio divided by total value
of all business done), which was also held valid.
69. 335 U.S. 80 (1948). See Hellerstein, State Franchise Taxation of
Interstate Business, 8 LAw. GuiLD REV. 429 (1949), for a complete discus-
sion of this case.
70. Miss. CoDE ANN. § 9313 (1942):
There is hereby imposed . . . a franchise or excise tax upon every
corporation . . . now existing in this state, or hereafter organized,
created or established, under and by virtue of the laws of the State
of Mississippi, equal to $1.50 for each $1,000.00 or fraction thereof,
of the value of the capital used, invested or employed in the exercise
of any power, privilege or right enjoyed by such organization within
this state, except as hereinafter provided. It being the purpose of this
section to require the payment to the State of Mississippi, this tax
for the right granted by the laws of this state to exist as such organi-
zation, and enjoy under the protection of the laws of this state, the
powers, rights, privileges and immunities derived from the state by
the form of such existence.
9314:
or the year 1940 and annually thereafter, there shall be and is hereby
imposed, levied and assessed upon every corporation, association orjoint stock company, as hereinbefore defined, organized and existing
under and by virtue of the laws of some other state, territory or
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business as a corporation in the state, the gas company instituted
a proceeding to determine the validity of the franchise tax as
applied to it. The gas company alleged, and Mississippi conceded,
the truth of the following statement:
Your Petitioner obtains no protection from the State of Mis-
sissippi and acquires no powers or privileges in its interstate
activity other than the protection afforded your Petitioner
by virtue of the payment of an ad valorem tax on the prop-
erty used by the company wholly in interstate commerce. 71
That counsel for the State of Mississippi may have thought
that the taxable event test was a dead issue so far as the Com-
merce Clause was concerned is indicated by their concession of
the above allegation, but at least four members of the Court did
not agree with this conclusion. The Chief Justice (Vinson) and
Justices Jackson and Burton concurred in a dissenting opinion
by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who concluded:
For we are all agreed that where the only 'local incident' is
the fact of interstate commerce-that the interstate pipeline
goes through Mississippi-the tax is necessarily a tax upon
the privilege of doing interstate business. The Commerce
Clause put an end to the power of the States to charge for
that privilege.72
Justices Douglas and Murphy concurred with Mr. Justice Reed
in his opinion, which concluded that the Supreme Court was
bound by the state court's interpretation of the statute. That
interpretation construed the tax as:
... an exaction... as a recompense for.., protection of
... the local activities in maintaining, keeping in repair, and
otherwise in manning the facilities of the system through-
out the 135 miles of its line in this state.73
country, or organized and existing without any specific statutory
authority, now, or hereafter doing business within this state as
hereinbefore defined, a franchise or excise tax equal to $1.50 of each
$1,000.00 or fraction thereof of the value of capital used, invested or
employed within this state, except as hereinafter provided. It being
the purpose of this section to require the payment of a tax by all
organizations not organized under the laws of this state, measured
by the amount of capital or its equivalent, for which such organization
receives the benefit and protection of the government and laws of the
state.
71. Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 83 (1948).
72. Id. at 102. The dissenting opinion concluded, of course, that the
tax as applied to the facts at hand was invalid. But see Central Grey-
"hound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948), where the Court's opinion
was written by the same Justice.
73. Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 84 (1948).
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This opinion, in other words, interpreted the agreed statement
to mean, "Your petitioner obtains no protection in its interstate
activity from the State of Mississippi [etc.].... [Italics added.] 7 4
In addition to thus applying the taxable event test, in which
the taxable events determined by following the state court's
interpretation of the statute, were classified intrastate commerce
because these events occurred wholly in Mississippi and could not
be taxed by another state, the opinion reasoned that the tax did
not have an unconstitutional effect upon interstate commerce;
therefore, the judgment of the state court should be affirmed.
Mr. Justice Reed used the multiple tax burden and the sub-
stantial effect tests as means of classifying the taxable event,
instead of using independent formulae. Mr. Justice Rutledge,
the originator of the substantial effects test, concurred in Mr.
Justice Reed's opinion but expressed his reservations as follows:
It may be that for the purposes of this case there is little
more than a verbal difference in so regarding the tax and in
looking at it as one not 'upon' the commerce, although affect-
ing it, but as being laid upon 'incidents of the commerce' or
'taxable events' taking place in Mississippi which are re-
garded as being 'sufficiently separate from' the commerce,
whether by reason of the apportionment or otherwise, to
sustain the tax. To the extent that no greater difference is
presently involved, I accept the Court's conclusions and its
reasoning.
But the difference conceivably may be of large, indeed of
controlling, importance for other cases. And, so far as this
may be true, I am unable to revert to rationalizations which
make merely verbal formulae without reflection of difference
in substantive effects controlling in these matters.75
Mr. Justice Black also concurred in Mr. Justice Reed's result
but did not render a written opinion.76
RETURN TO THE TAXABLE TEST
Mr. Justice Rutledge's anticipations became realities one year
later when the case of Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone77
was presented to the Court. The facts involved a Mississippi
74. See note 71 supra.
75. Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 97 (1948).
76. See note 51 supra.
77. 337 U.S. 662 (1949). See Mendelson, Recent Developments in State
Power to Regulate and Tax Interstate Commerce, 98 U. oF PA. L. Ru-.57 (1949), for a treatment of the 1949 interpretation of the Commerce
Clause by the Supreme Court.
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annual tax 8 upon the privilege of operating an oil or gas pipe
line. The Interstate Oil Pipe Line Company, another Delaware
corporation, owned and operated oil pipe lines extending from
various oil fields in Mississippi to railroads elsewhere in the State
of Mississippi. The pipe line company received orders from out
of state customers for oil, pumped the oil through the pipe lines,
and acted as agent of the customer in shipping the oil via
railroad, pursuant to the customer's instructions. The pipe
line company, of course, contended that the tax conflicted with
the Commerce Clause and was, therefore, invalid. Mr. Justice
Rutledge deliver an opinion in which Justices Black, Douglas,
and Murphy joined, upholding the validity of the tax in the
following terms:
We do not pause to consider whether the business of operat-
ing the intrastate pipe lines is interstate commerce, for, even
if we assume that it is, Mississippi has power to impose the
tax involved in this case....
Since all the activities upon which the tax is imposed are
carried on in Mississippi, there is no due process objection to
the tax. The tax does not discriminate against interstate
commerce in favor of competing intrastate commerce of like
character. The nature of the subject of taxation makes
apportionment unnecessary; there is no attempt to tax inter-
state activity carried on outside Mississippi's borders. No
other state can repeat the tax.79
The meaning of the economic interpretation of the multiple
tax burden test, as well as the idea of preventing discrimination
78. MISs. CODE ANN. § 10105 (1942):
There is hereby levied and shall be collected annual privilege taxes,
measured by the amount or volume of business done, against the
persons, on account of the business activities, and in the amounts to
be determined by the application of rates against values, or gross
income, or gross proceeds of sales, as the case may be, as follows (see
sections following):§ 10109: ...
Upon every person engaging or continuing within this state in the
business of operating a pipe line for transporting for compensation
or hire from one point to another in this state oil or natural gas or
artificial gas through pipes or conduits in this state, there is likewise
levied and shall be collected a tax, on account of the business engaged
in, equal to two per cent of the gross income of the business.
There" shall be excepted from the gross income used in determining
the measure of the tax imposed in this section so much thereof as is
derived from the business conducted in commerce between this state
and other states of the United States, or between this state and
foreign countries which the state of Mississippi is prohibited from
taxing under the Constitution of the United States of America....
79. 337 U.S. 662, 666 (1949).
STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE
against interstate commerce, was thus included in the substantial
effects doctrine. Although from the origin of the substantial
effects test in the Nippert case an economic element had been
the important component, this was the first occasion for the
express inclusion of the discrimination rule in the substantial
effects doctrine.8 0
Mr. Justice Burton concurred in the result, but only because
the tax was "on the privilege of operating a pipe line . . . in
intrastate commerce. ''s1
The remaining Justices, Reed, Frankfurter, Jackson, and the
Chief Justice (Vinson) followed the taxable event test and inter-
preted the business involved to be of interstate character because
the oil was physically within the stream of interstate commerce
when it began to flow in the pipe.
Five Justices reverted completely to the taxable test, and four
Justices advocated the substantial effects doctrine, but the major-
ity bloc was divided in its definition of interstate commerce. The
result advocated by the adherents of the economic test was thus
accomplished.
With the Court in this divided approach to the problem, two
vacancies occurred in the Court's membership. President Truman
appointed Attorney General Clark and Federal District Judge
Minton to fill, respectively, the offices vacated by the deaths of
Justices Murphy and Rutledge. After a very short period, the
new appointees received an opportunity to express their ideas
concerning this problem.82
A Missouri corporation engaged exclusively in interstate truck-
ing contended that a Connecticut franchise tax 3 imposed, "for
80. The tax in the Nippert case applied to residents and non-residents
alike; therefore, there was no question of discrimination against inter-
state commerce in favor of similar intrastate commerce. Any economic
rule, nevertheless, would include a discrimination element; so, Mr. Justice
Rutledge's present statement of the rule was a normal development.
81. 337 U.S. 662, 668 (1949).
82. Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951). See also
Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951).
83. CONN. REv. GEN. STAT. § 1897 (1949):
Imposition of tax. Every mutual savings bank, savings and loan
association and building and loan association doing business in this
state, and every other corporation or association carrying on, or
having the right to carry on, business in this state which is required
to report to the collector of internal revenue for the district in which
such corporation or association has its principal place of business for
the purpose of assessment, collection and payment of an income tax
with exceptions not material here) . . . shall pay, annually, a tax
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the privilege of carrying on or doing business within the state,"'
conflicted with the Commerce Clause. Although the State Tax
Commissioner admitted that the corporation was engaged ex-
clusively in interstate commerce, he pointed out that the tax was.
computed at a nondiscriminatory rate on that part of the corpo-
ration's net income which was reasonably attributable to its
business activities within the state. There was no escape from
the problem by classification of the corporation's activities as
intrastate. 4 The Court had to decide whether interstate com-
merce, as such, could be required by the state to pay its fair
share of taxation. Mr. Justice Minton joined the Frankfurter,
Reed, Jackson, Vinson, Burton bloc which applied the taxable
event test and, obviously, concluded that the tax was invalid.
Mr. Justice Clark, who agreed with Justices Black and Douglas,
advocated the same ideas which his predecessor had proclaimed.
The majority opinion by Mr. Justice Burton, stated, "They
[the states] delegated to the United States the exclusive power
to tax the privilege to engage in interstate commerce...."8
The taxable event test, i.e., that the taxable event cannot be
interstate commerce, was followed by six Justices, whereas the
three dissenting Justices advocated the idea associated with the
substantial effects test.
CONCLUSION
In spite of the many judicial opinions rendered throughout the
past half century, the basic problem involved in state taxation
of interstate commerce continues to exist. If the states tax intra-
state commerce but are not allowed to tax similar interstate
commerce, competitive intrastate commerce will be at a disadvan-
tage. If each state, on the other hand, is allowed to select an
or excise upon its franchise for the privilege of carrying on or doing
business within the state, such tax to be measured by the entire net
income as herein defined received by such corporation or association
from business transacted within the state during the income year and
to be assessed at the rate of two per cent....
84. The Court stated:
The tax is not levied as compensation for the use of highways or
collected in lieu of an ad valorem property tax. Those bases of taxa-
tion have been disclaimed by the highest court of the taxing State.
It is not a fee for an inspection or a tax on sales or use. It is a 'tax
or excise' placed unequivocally upon the corporation's franchise for
the privilege of carrying on exclusively interstate transporation in the
State....
840 U.S. 602, 607 (1951).
85. Id. at 608.
STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE
event-one part of the interstate commerce-as a subject for
taxation, the sum total of the state taxes will place interstate
commerce at a disadvantage in relation to competitive intrastate
commerce. How can competing interstate and intrastate com-
merce be taxed so that neither will be placed in an unfavorable
position? The substantial effects and multiple tax burden tests
recognize the nature of the problem as economic and attempt to
solve it by weighing economic factors. The present majority bloc
probably feels that adoption of the economic test might subject
interstate commerce to more and greater state taxation and thus
tend to place interstate commerce in an unfavorable relation to
competitive intrastate commerce. They are willing to allow the
states to tax small parts of interstate commerce when such events
are classified intrastate commerce.86 The Court, however, has not
suggested a test to determine the interstate-intrastate classifica-
tion of the event selected for taxation.
An attorney can not competently advise his client on problems
in this field unless there is a Supreme Court precedent very simi-
lar to the problem involved. The present majority bloc would
probably hasten to point out that an attorney would be in the
same position if he were attempting to advise his client on the
basis of the application of an economic test. In fact, the attorney
would have more precedents on the resolving of the interstate-
intrastate classification of the event taxed than he would have
on the weighing of economic factors.
The value of having laws which can be interpreted by attor-
neys and advice rendered thereon which is a fairly accurate
estimate of how the courts will hold is indeed important. But
it is also important to maintain the proper balance between
interstate and intrastate commerce. If the Court adopts a general
criterion which might result in placing either interstate or intra-
state commerce in an unfavorable position in relation to the
other, it might result in the abolition of that type of commerce.
This, of course, would hurt the nation or the state, and damage
to either would constitute damage to both under our present
form of government.
The Court is solving each case as it arises without establishing
detailed principles to prevent future litigation, but in doing so
86. Or for such purposes as are listed in note 84 supra.
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it is ever careful to tread slowly with the constant thought of
preserving the constitutional relations between the states and
the United States.87
87. See, for example, cases involving use of the taxation power to
accomplish purposes other than to raise revenue; McCray v. United States,
195 U.S. 27 (1904); United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919);
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922); Hill v. Wallace, 259
U.S. 44 (1922); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); Steward
Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S.
619 (1937).
